This paper analyzes a risk averse entrepreneur's real investment decision under incomplete markets. The entrepreneur smoothes his intertemporal consumption by investing in both a risk-free asset and a risky asset, which allows him to partially hedge against the project cash flow risk. We show that risk aversion lowers both the project value upon investment and the option value of waiting to invest through the precautionary saving effect. Furthermore, risk aversion delays investment since the project value is reduced more than the option value to invest. It is also shown that although hedging can reduce the cash flow risk, it may have a positive or negative return effect, depending on the correlation between the cash flow risk and the market. Consequently, investment timing is not monotonic with the extent of hedging opportunity. Finally, welfare implications of hedging are analyzed.
Entrepreneurs play an important role in fostering innovation and economic growth (Schumpeter (1934) ). It is often suggested that an "entrepreneur" is someone who combines upfront business investments with entrepreneurial skill to obtain the chance of earning cash flows. This notion ranges from inventors who create new products or even new industries to local business people starting restaurants and retail stores.
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A common feature of entrepreneurs is that their business investments, consumptionsaving, and portfolio selection decisions are interdependent. The aim of this paper is to provide a dynamic model to analyze this interdependence.
We model an entrepreneur's business investment decision as a real options problem. Since the seminal work of Brennan and Schwartz (1985) and McDonald and Siegel (1986) , the real options approach to investment under uncertainty has become an essential part of modern economics and finance. The key insights that waiting has positive value and that the opportunity to invest in a project is analogous to an American call option on the investment opportunity have been generally accepted. This is reflected by the fact that many corporate finance textbooks devote at least a chapter to the real options approach (e.g. Brealey and Myers (2002) ). Furthermore, related research has been actively published in academic journals.
Although the real options approach to investment has been developed substantially, 2 most papers in this literature either assume that markets are complete or decision makers are risk neutral. While either assumption serves as a natural starting point in order for researchers to single out and focus on the option value of waiting, 1 See Gentry and Hubbard (2004) for this definition. 2 The standard real options approach to investment has been excellently summarized in Dixit and Pindyck (1994) . Recent developments include agency , Grenadier, Miao and Wang (2004) ), ambiguity ), macroeconomic conditions (Guo, Miao, and Morellec (2004) ), industry equilibrium (Grenadier (2002) , Miao (2004) ), strategic interaction (Grenadier (1996) , Miltersen and Schwartz (2002) ), and imperfect information (Grenadier (1999) , Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003) , Berk, Green, and Naik (2004) ).
both assumptions are strong and made primarily for tractability reasons. For example, under complete markets, the physical investment opportunity must be spanned by existing assets in the economy which requires that it be either freely traded or replicated by other assets or portfolios. Under this assumption, one can apply the contingent claims analysis (Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973) ) to determine the option value and investment timing. Although assuming risk neutrality and applying dynamic programming can deal with incomplete markets, it is not particularly relevant to the vast risk averse investors in reality.
In reality, it is often the case that risk averse entrepreneurs own investment projects and make investment decisions.
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These projects may not be freely traded or their payoffs may not be spanned by existing assets because of liquidity restrictions or the lack of liquid markets. These capital market imperfections may be due to moral hazard, adverse selection, transactions costs, or contractual restrictions. As examples, liquid markets for projects to develop new products or R&D ventures often do not exist. Moreover, the results of these projects may be hard to predict so that the associated future cash flows may be unrelated to the risk of the existing assets. Thus these investment opportunities may have substantial idiosyncratic risks. Owning them exposes entrepreneurs to these un-diversifiable risks.
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Consequently, entrepreneurs' lifetime well beings naturally heavily depend on the outcome of their investments subject to un-diversifiable idiosyncratic risks. Moreover, entrepreneurs' attitudes towards risk should play an important role in determining their consumption-saving, portfolio selection, and investment decisions.
This paper provides a utility-based framework to analyze a risk averse entrepreneur's investment decision under uncertainty and incomplete markets. Extending McDonald and Siegel (1986) , we build a model in which the entrepreneur maximizes expected utility from consumption streams when he has a nontraded investment opportunity.
We first consider a baseline model where the entrepreneur can only trade a risk-free asset to smooth consumption. We then study the case where the entrepreneur can also trade a risky asset, which can be used to hedge against the cash flow risk. This paper contributes to the literature on the real options approach to investment by providing an analysis on how risk aversion and market incompleteness affect investment timing. This paper also adds to the literature on hedging by analyzing the impact of hedging on investment timing and welfare in an incomplete-markets environment.
According to the standard real options approach under complete markets or risk neutrality, risk aversion does not play any role in real investement timing decision.
By contrast, we show that risk aversion delays investment in our incomplete markets setting. The mechanism of the impact of risk aversion is manifested through the consumption smoothing (precautionary saving) effect.
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Specifically, investment generates a stream of stochastic income and thus exposes the entrepreneur to the uninsurable cash flow risk. An increase in the degree of risk aversion raises precautionary savings, thereby reducing consumption both before and after investment. Consequently, it lowers both the project value and the option value to invest.
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We further show that the project value is reduced more than the option value, implying that investment is delayed.
We also show that investment timing and welfare may not be monotonic with the 5 An agent is said to be precautionary, if his marginal utility is convex. Leland (1968) provides an early contribution to precautionary saving. See Kimball (1990) for an axiomatic treatment of precautionary saving.
6 These values are interpreted as subjective values, but not market values. They are defined using the "certainty equivalent" approach in the literature on the pricing of nontraded assets (e.g., Svensson and Werner (1993) , Hall and Murphy (2000) , Kahl et al. (2003) , and references therein). See Section 2.2 for further discussions.
extent of hedging or the correlation between the project risk and the market. This is in sharp contrast to the conventional view that hedging reduces cash flow risk, and hence it should speed up investment and raise welfare. The reason is that in addition to the preceding risk reduction effect, for the budget constrained entrepreneur, hedging may result in losses of returns from the hedging asset, thereby reducing wealth and the net gains from investment. Depending on the degree of risk aversion, riskiness of projects, and Sharpe ratios of hedging assets, either one of the effects may dominate.
This happens when the project risk is positively correlated with the market since the entrepreneur holds a short position on the hedging asset. By contrast, if the correlation is negative, then the return effect is always positive since the entrepreneur holds a long position on the hedging asset. In this case, an increase in the extent of hedging accelerates investment and raises welfare.
Our paper relates to the voluminous consumption-saving literature, pioneered by Friedman (1957) . Consumption-saving models study how an individual smooths his consumption over time when he is endowed with an exogenously specified stochastic uninsurable income process. This paper is also related to the portfolio choice literature. Duffie et al. (1997) study hedging strategies when an investor is endowed with nontraded stochastic income and maximizes expected utility from consumption streams. Unlike these two strands of literature, in our model the stochastic income process is endogenously determined by the entrepreneur's investment timing decision.
The paper closest to ours is Hugonnier and Morellec (2004) . In contrast to our result, Hugonnier and Morellec (2004) show that risk aversion decreases the option value to invest, thereby speeding up investment. There are three major differences between their paper and ours. First, they assume that an investor/manager maximizes expected utility from wealth at the random time of investment. They do not consider intermediate consumption and the consumption after investment. Therefore, they neglect the impact of risk aversion on the utility and consumption after investment, or on the value of the project. Second, they do not study the impact of hedging on investment timing and welfare. Finally, they consider the role of the market for corporate control in constraining management, while we abstract from this consideration.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 analyzes a baseline model in which there is no risky asset available for hedging. Section 3 analyzes a model with hedging. Section 4 concludes. Technical details are relegated to appendices.
A Baseline Model
This section provides a model that allows us to develop intuition on how the entrepreneur's risk aversion affects his investment decision when markets are incomplete. In order to achieve this objective in a simplest possible setting, we integrate a canonical incomplete-markets consumption-saving model with a version of irreversible investment modelà la McDonald and Siegel (1986) .
Setup
Time is continuous and horizon is infinite. Uncertainty is represented by a probability space Ω, F, {F t } t≥0 , P , on which all stochastic processes are defined. Here {F t } t≥0 is the augmented filtration generated by the standard Brownian motion (Z t ) t≥0 .
There is a single perishable consumption good (the numeraire). Let C be the space of progressively measurable consumption processes C such that t 0 |C s | ds < ∞ for any t ≥ 0. The entrepreneur derives utility from a consumption process (C t ) t≥0 ∈ C according to the utility function
where β > 0 is the discount rate and U is an increasing and concave vNM index.
We consider the CARA specification U (c) = −e −γc /γ, c ∈ R, where γ > 0 is the absolution risk aversion parameter. We choose this utility specification primarily for its technical tractability. It is well known that this utility function rules out wealth effect and hence facilitates closed form solutions.
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The entrepreneur has an investment project, which can be undertaken irreversibly, is governed by an arithmetic Brownian motion process
where α and σ are positive constants and Z is a standard Brownian motion. This process implies that cash flows may take negative values. We interpret negative cash flows as losses.
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The standard real options approach to investment tackles this type of optimization problem via one of the following two methods. One method is to assume that markets are complete in the sense that the project cash flow can be freely traded or there is another traded asset that can replicate the cash flows. Then one can appeal to the contingent claims analysis to determine the option value of investment and the option exercise time. Alternatively, it is assumed that the entrepreneur is risk neutral and thus maximizes the discounted value of cash flows. A dynamic programming approach is often used under such a setting.
Unlike the standard real options settings summarized above, the entrepreneur in our model is neither risk neutral nor faces complete markets. Instead, the en-7 The CARA utility has been widely adopted in the literature on consumption (Caballero (1991 ), Wang (2004 ), asset pricing (Wang (1993) ), and portfolio choice (Merton (1969) , Svensson and Werner (1993) , Liu (2004) ).
8 Unlike the usual geometric Brownian motion process, the specification in (2) proves more convenient within the present model. This is essentially due to the results for a class of exponential-affine models. See Duffie (2001) on introductory treatment on affine models and Wang (2004) on affine consumption models.
trepreneur only has access to one financial asset. Specifically, he may borrow or lend at a constant risk-free rate r > 0. In other words, saving is the only financial investment that the entrepreneur may use to smooth his consumption over time. Given that the cash flows of the investment project is stochastic, markets are naturally incomplete.
Let τ be the stopping time of investment and T be the set of {F t } t≥0 -stopping times. Let (W t ) t≥0 be the wealth process. Then the entrepreneur's decision problem is to choose (τ, C) ∈ T × C so as to maximize (1) subject to the wealth dynamics
and a transversality condition specified later. The first wealth dynamics (3) states that wealth is accumulated from saving assuming the entrepreneur has no other income during the period before investment t ≤ τ . The second wealth dynamics (4) describes the wealth accumulation after investment. At the instant of investment time τ, the entrepreneur pays investment cost I and hence wealth is lowered to
After investment t ≥ τ , the entrepreneur receives income from the investment cash flows Y t . As usual, we interpret negative wealth as borrowing. In order to focus on the effect of market incompleteness in a simplest possible setting, we do not consider borrowing constraints or costly external financing.
Model Solution
We solve the entrepreneur's problem backward by dynamic programming. We first consider the problem after investment has been taken place. Let J (w, y) be the corresponding value function. By a standard argument, J (w, y) satisfies the following standard Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation:
The transversality condition must also be satisfied lim
We next consider the case before investment. Let V (w, y) denote the corresponding value function. Similarly, V (w, y) satisfies the HJB equation
We now specify boundary conditions. First, the following no-bubble condition must be satisfied
This condition states that when the investment cash flow goes to negative infinity, the entrepreneur will never exercise the option and his value function must be finite.
Next, as is standard in the optimal stopping problems, at the instant of investment, the following value matching condition must hold
This equation implicitly determines an investment boundary y = y (w) . Finally, because this boundary is chosen optimally, the following smooth-pasting condition must be satisfied 9 ∂V (w, y) ∂w
∂V (w, y) ∂y
Notice that the above problem is a mixed control and stopping problem, which is generally difficult to solve. Since our objective is to highlight the intuition on how risk aversion affects investment decision, we have intentionally chosen the CARA utility specification, because CARA utility has no wealth effect and permits a closed form solution to the value functions. The functional form of value functions implies that 9 See, for example, Krylov (1980) , Dumas (1991) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) .
wealth can be cancelled out on the two sides of equations (8)- (10). As a result, the investment boundary is flat, in that y (w) is independent of wealth w. This allows us to simplify the above optimization problem substantially from a two-dimensional free boundary problem to a one-dimensional one. We are then able to derive closed form solutions to the consumption and investment policies up to an ODE. The following proposition summarizes the solution.
Proposition 1 Let (g,ȳ) be the solution to the free boundary problem
subject to the boundary conditions
where f (y) is given by In the waiting region, the value function V (w, y) and the optimal consumption policy c (w, y) are given by
In the investment region, the value function J (w, y) and the optimal consumption policy c (w, y) are given by
Finally, the entrepreneur invests in the project the first time the process (Y t ) t≥0 hits the thresholdȳ.
We first observe that equations (11)- (14) are similar to those obtained in the standard real options problems (e.g. McDonald and Siegel (1986) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) ). Specifically, one can interpret f (y) as the (subjective) value of the project and g (y) as the (subjective) value of the option to invest. Although under incomplete markets there is no well defined market value for the nontraded investment project, our interpretation can be justified by adopting the certainty equivalent approach in the literature on the pricing of nontraded assets. Specifically, define the (option)
value of the project as the price at which the entrepreneur is indifferent between the situation where he pays this price and obtains the investment (option) cash flows and the situation where he has no investment project. It is straightforward to calculate the value function under the latter situation. The biggest difference between our model and the standard real options model is that both the project value f and the option value g depend on not only the parameters describing the asset value such as the riskless rate r, drift α and volatility 10 Specifically, the value function is given by −
σ, but also the entrepreneur's risk aversion coefficient γ. This observation is important for understanding the analysis below.
The dependence of the project value f and the option value g on risk aversion
captures precisely the fact that the entrepreneur's risk aversion matters not only for consumption decisions, but also for investment decisions when markets are incomplete. We now analyze the intuition in detail. Consider first the consumption rule after investment is made. We are able to derive an explicit solution given in (19)- (15),
to a large extent due to the CARA utility specification.
11
To understand this rule, we define human wealth h as the present discounted value of all investment cash flows following Friedman (1957) and Hall (1978) . For our arithmetic Brownian motion income process, this gives
Using the definition of human wealth, we may rewrite the consumption rule given in (19) and (15) as follows:
The first term in (21) is the annuity value of the sum of financial wealth w and human wealth h. If this were the only term in the consumption rule, then the consumption rule would correspond to Friedman's seminal permanent-income hypothesis and the implied consumption is a martingale (Hall (1978) ). This is the core of consumption smoothing if the agent does not have any precautionary motive and if his subjective discount rate is equal to the riskless rate. The second term in (21) incorporates the agent's preference for intertemporal consumption arising solely from the differential between his subjective discount rate and the interest rate.
Most importantly, the third term in (21) captures the precautionary saving motive, which is induced by the cash flow risk after investment is made. It is increasing in risk aversion γ and volatility σ of the cash flow.
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The precautionary saving lowers the consumption after investment, and hence lowers the project value f.
Turn to the consumption rule before investment given in (17). It admits a similar interpretation. However, we do not have a closed form solution for g because of the presence of the last nonlinear term in (11). Intuitively, this term reflects the precautionary saving effect. It also lowers the option value g. If the entrepreneur obtained a cash stock at the instant of investment and did not obtain any cash flows in the future, then the decreased option value g would speed up investment. This is actually the main reason leading to the result in Hugonnier and Morellec (2004) .
Observe that the entrepreneur's consumption is influenced by the cash flow y, even though he does not actually receive any cash flows before investment. This is because the entrepreneur is a forward-looking agent. Although he does not receive any income from y before investment, he rationally anticipates that the evolution of the future cash flow attainable upon his investing is relevant for his consumption decision making even before investment. This idea is at the core of permanent-income hypothesis. Alternatively, we may view that the agent uses saving to partially hedge against changes in his investment opportunity set, the "future" cash flow process in our setting. This interpretation leads us to link to the enormous portfolio choice literature pioneered by Merton (1969) .
Finally, notice that the investment thresholdȳ is independent of the discount rate β. This is because it has no impact on the project value f and the option value g 12 More precisely, it is the third derivative of utility function that matters for our analysis. That is, the convex marginal utility gives rise to precautionary saving motive (Kimball (1990) ) and thus affects investment timing decisions. For CARA utility, the coefficient of absolute prudence −u /u , which measures the precautionary motive, is equal to the coefficient of absolute risk aversion −u /u = γ. For CRRA utility, precautionary saving is also positively related to the constant risk aversion coefficient. The classic example that differentiates risk aversion from precautionary saving is quadratic utility. An agent with quadratic utility is risk averse, but has no precautionary motive (the marginal utility is linear, not strictly convex.) The investment timing decision for an entrepreneur with quadratic utility will thus not be affected by his risk aversion. Quadratic utility is viewed by economists as an implausible utility specification because it implies increasing absolute risk aversion, inconsistent with empirical evidence.
given our CARA specification. Consequently, in our simulations below, we always set
Before delving into the details on the effect of risk aversion on investment timing, we first sketch out a simple case in which there is no cash flow risk. We define the value maximizing investment policy as the solution to the following problem
The following proposition summarizes the relation between the utility-maximizing investment policy and the value-maximizing investment policy when cash flow is deterministic. 
Risk Aversion and Investment Timing
When there is cash flow risk and markets are incomplete, risk aversion plays an important role in determining investment timing. Because there is no analytical solution to the free boundary problem (11)- (14), we resort to numerical simulations.
To this end, baseline parameter values must be assigned. We set the risk-free rate r = 2% and the discount rate β = r = 2%. We consider a project with I = 10, Y 0 = 0, α = 0.1, and σ = 0.1. We leave the coefficient of absolute risk aversion γ as a free parameter since its consensus estimate is not available in the literature. (15)). Moreover, it lowers the option value of waiting g (as seen from the last term in (11)), thereby mitigating the positive option effect. Simulations reveal that the former effect dominates. This is illustrated in Figure 3 , which plots the changes of the functions f and g when volatility σ is increased from 5% to 30%. This figure also reveals that the negative precautionary saving effect dominates the option effect so that g shifts down.
Figure 2 also shows that the impact of volatility becomes larger for higher values of the risk aversion parameter. For example, for γ = 0.1, when σ is increased from 5% to 30%, the investment threshold increases from 0.2125 to 0.6472, which implies that investment is delayed by 4.3 years on average.
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This also implies that the investment probability within 5 years is lowered by 39%. By contrast, for γ = 1, 13 The average hitting time for the process (Y t ) t≥0 between two points y and z is given by |y −z|/α.
when σ is increased from 5% to 30%, the investment threshold increases from 0.2128 to 1.1655, which implies that investment is delayed by 9.5 years on average and the investment probability within 5 years is lowered by 74%.
[Insert Figures 2-3] Turn to the impact of changes in the degree of risk aversion. Importantly, Figure 2 reveals that the investment threshold increases with the degree of risk aversion. That is, risk aversion delays investment. The intuition behind the impact of risk aversion is related to the discussion following Proposition 1. Recall that we interpret f as the value of the project and g as the option value to invest. Figure 4 plots the changes of the functions f and g when risk aversion γ is increased from 0.1 to 1. When γ is increased, the precautionary saving rises. This lowers consumption and hence the project value f. In the mean time, due to precautionary saving, consumption before investment also decreases and hence the option value g falls. Simulation results reveal that the former effect dominates the latter so that the entrepreneur delays investment.
This dominance is intuitive since the entrepreneur does not bear directly cash flow risk before investment is actually taken place. Therefore, the precautionary saving effect before investment is not as strong as that after investment.
[Insert Figure 4 ] However, for low volatilities, the response of the investment threshold is quite small. This is intuitive since when risk is low, risk aversion should not play a significant role. By contrast, when volatility is high, the investment threshold varies significantly with the degree of risk aversion. For example, for σ = 10%, when γ is
The investment probability within T years is given by
where Φ( · ) is the cumulative standard normal distribution function.
increased from 0.1 to 1, the investment threshold increases from 0.2500 to 0.2548, which implies that investment is delayed by only 18 days (0.05 years) and the investment probability within 5 years is lowered by 0.4%. By contrast, for σ = 30%, when γ is increased from 0.1 to 1, the investment threshold increases from 0.6472 to 1.1655, which implies that investment is delayed by 5.2 years and the investment probability within 5 years is lowered by 35%.
Hedging and Investment
So far, we have assumed that the entrepreneur can trade a riskless asset only to smooth consumption and diversify cash flow risk. This is clearly unrealistic since in reality entrepreneurs can trade financial assets to hedge against cash flow risk. In this section, we study the implications of hedging.
Setup
Assume that the entrepreneur can trade a risky asset to hedge against the cash flow risk, in addition to the risk-free asset. One can think of this asset as a futures contract or a market portfolio. Let P t denote the risky asset's price at date t. Let its returns be governed by the process
where µ e and σ e are positive constants, and B is a standard Brownian motion correlated with the Brownian motion Z and defined on the probability space Ω, F, {F t } t≥0 , P .
Let ρ ∈ [−1, 1] be the correlation coefficient. Here the filtration {F t } t≥0 is generated by the Brownian motions Z and B.
One can alternatively rewrite (2), the cash flow generated from investment as The entrepreneur's problem is to choose consumption, portfolio and investment timing (C, π, τ ) ∈ C × A × T so as to maximize (1) subject to the wealth dynamics:
The wealth dynamics (25)- (26) admit an interpretation similar to that for (3)-(4).
The difference is that here the entrepreneur can invest π t dollars in the risky hedging asset, and thus affects the drift and volatility of wealth accordingly.
Model Solution
Similar to our solution methodology in Section 2.2, we solve the entrepreneur's problem backward by dynamic programming. The following proposition characterizes the solution.
Proposition 3 Define the Sharpe ratio η = (µ e − r)/σ e . Let (g, y *
) be the solution to the free boundary problem
where f (y) is given by 
}.
In the waiting region, the optimal consumption and portfolio rules are given by
In the investment region, the optimal consumption and portfolio rules are given by
Finally, the entrepreneur invests in the project the first time the process (Y t ) t≥0 hits the threshold y * .
Much intuition behind this proposition is similar to that described in Section 2.
Specifically, one can think of the investment problem as an option exercise problem where the underlying project value is given by f (y) and the option value is given by g (y) . Both f and g depend on model parameters related to asset value and preferences. Unlike the model in Section 2, f and g also depend on the hedging asset's Sharpe ratio η and the correlation coefficient ρ. Note that the investment threshold y * is independent of the discount rate β, same as in Section 2. In addition, comparing the free boundary problem (27)- (30) with (11)- (14), one can see that the investment threshold y * when ρ = 0 is the same as y. The intuition is as follows.
While the new risky asset allows the agent to take advantage of the expected excess returns, it does not offer any hedging benefits. While the entrepreneur enjoys the same gains in expected excess returns before and after investment, his cash flow risk remains the same with or without the risky asset (whose correlation is zero with cash flow Y . As a result, the investment timing strategy remains the same as the one studied in Section 2.
The key new element of the model in this section is that the entrepreneur can also invest in a risky hedging asset to diversify cash flow risk. The demand for this asset is given in (33) and (35). The first term in these expressions represents the standard mean-variance efficient rule (Merton (1969) ). The second term represents the hedging demand. In order to minimize the variation of consumption, the entrepreneur holds a short position on the risky asset if ρ > 0, and a long position if ρ < 0.
The conventional wisdom is that hedging can reduce investment risk. In our model, this effect is manifested in the consumption rules before and after investment.
Consider first the consumption rule after investment, particularly the last term in Hedging has a similar effect on the consumption rule before investment. In particular, one can interpret the last term in (27) as a consumption smoothing (precautionary saving) effect. One can also interpret the term −ρησg (y) as the return effect.
Because of the presence of hedging opportunities, the extent of hedging measured by ρ and the risk characteristic of the hedging asset measured by η are important determinants of investment timing. Before turning to the detailed analysis of hedging effect on investment timing, we first briefly sketch out the investment timing decision under complete markets.
When markets are complete (ρ = ±1), we can derive an explicit solution to the free boundary problem (27)-(30). Here, we present the solution for ρ = 1 only.
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We shall compare it with the value-maximizing policy defined as the solution to the following problem
where (ξ t ) t≥0 is the unique state price density process (ξ t ) t≥0 satisfying −dξ t /ξ t = rdt + ηdZ t , ξ 0 = 1. We summarize the relation in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Let ρ = 1. Then the investment threshold y * , the option value to invest g, and the hedging demand before investment Π (w, y) are respectively given by
. This utility maximizing policy is the same as the value-maximizing policy for any strictly increasing utility U.
This proposition demonstrates that when markets are complete, the subjective option value to invest g (y) is identical to the market option value F (y) . In addition, the investment threshold given in (37) is independent of preference parameters. This is consistent with the general principle that the option value and exercise trigger are independent of preferences if markets are complete (e.g., Dixit and Pindyck (1994) ).
Indeed, since markets are complete, we can apply the martingale method to rewrite the dynamic budget constraint as a static one, using the unique state price density.
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The entrepreneur's decision problem can then be formulated as a two-stage problem as in the deterministic case described in Section 2.2: (i) choose an investment policy to maximize the option value (36) so that total wealth is maximized; (ii) choose optimal consumption given this total wealth.
Implications for Investment Timing
We now turn to the general case where markets are incomplete. We analyze the important question of how investment timing is affected by uncertainty, risk aversion and hedging opportunities. We use parameter values in Section 2.3 as baseline values.
In addition, we set the Sharpe ratio η = 0.3. For example, this corresponds to a risk premium of 6% and a volatility of 20%. Finally, we treat the risk aversion parameter γ and correlation ρ as free parameters.
Cash Flow Risk Consider first the impact of changes in the cash flow volatility σ. to the values of γ, ρ, and η. As in the model in Section 2, it is intuitive that, under incomplete markets, the impact of volatility should be larger for more risk averse entrepreneurs. Surprisingly, we also find that the impact of volatility is quite different for ρ > 0 than for ρ < 0. Specifically, Figure 6b reveals that when the project cash flows are negatively correlated to the hedging asset, the impact of the project risk is smaller if the extent of hedging is higher (i.e., |ρ| is bigger). By contrast, Figure   5b indicates an opposite result, implying that hedging destabilizes investment timing when the project cash flows are positively correlated with the hedging asset.
The above sensitivity is in sharp contrast to the standard result under complete markets or risk neutrality, which is explicitly stated in Dixit and Pindyck (1994, p.153 The intuition behind this difference is similar to that described in Section 2.3.
Specifically, under incomplete markets, an increase in σ has the precautionary saving and option effects. In addition, there is an extra return effect. The return effect is positive for ρ < 0 and negative for ρ > 0. These effects influence both the project value f and the option value to invest g. Furthermore, the magnitude of changes of f and g depends on the values of parameters γ, ρ, and η. Surprisingly, these figures also indicate that the investment threshold first increases and then decreases with ρ > 0 for high risk aversion γ, high volatility σ and low Sharpe ratio η. In particular, investment timing is not monotonic with the incompleteness of markets. The top panel of Figure 7 illustrates the impact of the increase of ρ from 0.3 to 1. It reveals that the negative return effect dominates so that investment is delayed.
[Insert Figure 7 Here]
The intuition behind the above result is related to the discussion following Proposition 3. Specifically, on the one hand, an increase in ρ > 0 reduces the entrepreneur's exposure to the cash flow risk. The reduced risk exposure lowers the precautionary saving and raises consumption, thereby raising the project value f and the option value to invest g. On the other hand, an increase in ρ > 0 raises the short position on the hedging asset (see (35) and (33) implying that using hedging assets with a high market price of risk delays investment.
By contrast, when ρ < 0, an opposite result follows.
Again, the intuition behind the above result is related to the discussion following Proposition 3. When ρ > 0, hedging has a negative return effect. In particular, an increase in η results in losses of returns from the hedging asset and reduces wealth, thereby reducing the project value f and the option value to invest g. Simulation results show that f decreases more than g, and hence investment is delayed. By contrast, when ρ < 0, hedging has a positive return effect and hence leads to the opposite result.
Welfare Implications of Hedging
It is clear that with an additional hedging asset available for trade, the entrepreneur is always better off compared with the case where the risk-free asset is the only financial investment opportunity. Consequently, to examine the welfare implications of hedging, we assume that the entrepreneur always has the opportunity to invest in a risk-free asset and in a risky asset as well. A risky asset is characterized by its Sharpe ratio and the extent to which it is correlated with the cash flow risk. We ask the following question: What kind of risky asset should the entrepreneur choose to hedge against the cash flow risk? The common intuition is that the entrepreneur should invest in a risky asset which is highly correlated with the cash flow risk. We will show below that this intuition is not the whole story.
In order to address this issue, we compute the additional amount of wealth the entrepreneur can be gained when he invests in a risky asset correlated with the cash flow risk, compared with the case where he invests in a risky asset with the same the value function before investment for the model with hedging when the correlation coefficient is ρ. Then the welfare gain x is the solution to equation: V (w, y; ρ) = V (w + x, y; 0) . By Propositions 3, one can show that x = g (y; ρ)−g (y; 0) . We assume initially y = 0, which implies that the investment project has not been undertaken in our simulations.
The welfare gains from hedging after investment can be defined similarly. It follows from Proposition 3 that these welfare gains are given by
This expression illustrates explicitly the two effects of hedging discussed earlier.
On the one hand, hedging reduces cash flow risk, thereby increasing wealth by Hedging has similar implications for the welfare before investment. This is confirmed in Figure 8 , which plots the welfare gains before investment for various parameter values.
[Insert Figure 8 Here] 
Appendices

A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: The value function after investment is defined as
We conjecture that J takes the form given in (18), where f (y) is a function to be determined. To solve for this function,
we use the first-order condition U (c) = J w (w, y) to derive the optimal consumption rule given in (19). Substitute it back into the HJB equation (5) to derive the ODE
It can be verified that its solution is given by (15). Moreover, it is such that the value function satisfies the transversality condition.
We now consider the case before investment. By the principle of optimality, the value function V (w, y) satisfies
We conjecture that V takes the form in (16),
where g(y) is a function to be determined. From the first-order condition U (c) = V w (w, y) , we can derive the consumption policy before investment given in (17).
Substituting it into the HJB equation (6), we can show that g (y) satisfies the ODE (11). Given the functional forms of the value functions, one can show that the nobubble condition, the value matching and smooth pasting conditions become (12)- (14). Finally, by (18), (16) and assumption, the set
is the waiting region. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2:
When σ = 0, the free-boundary problem can be easily solved. One can derive that the solution is
It is easy to show that the value maximizing investment threshold is also given by rI.
Finally, we can equivalently rewrite the wealth dynamics (3)- (4) as
where we have imposed a no-Ponzi game assumption, lim T →∞ e −rT W T = 0. Now it is clear that for any strictly increasing utility function U, the utility maximizing investment policy must maximize the net present value (22). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3:
The value function after investment is defined as
By a standard argument, J (w, y) satisfies the HJB equation
J ww (w, y) + πσ e σρJ wy (w, y) .
The transversality condition lim T →∞ E e
−rT J (W T , Y T ) = 0 must also be satisfied.
We conjecture that J (w, y) takes the form
where the function f is to be determined. By the first order conditions 
Solving yields (31). It can be verified that this solution satisfies the transversality condition.
We now turn to the case before investment. By the principle of optimality, the value function before investment V (w, y) satisfies
Then V (w, y) satisfies the following HJB equation
V ww (w, y) + πσ e σρV wy (w, y) .
We conjecture that the value function V takes the form
where g(y) is a function to be determined. Using the first-order conditions, .
Re-arranging and simplifying gives (11). As in Section 2, the boundary conditions are given by the no-bubble, value-matching, and smooth-pasting conditions similar to (7)-(10). Using these boundary conditions, one can derive (28)-(30). Finally, by (A.9), (A.15) and assumption, the set
Proof of Proposition 4:
When ρ = 1, the solution to ODE (11) is given by .18) where A 1 and A 2 are constants to be determined, λ is given in the proposition, and . Simple algebra delivers (37)-(38).
The general solution is given by F (y) = Ae λy , where A is a constant to be determined. Notice that we have used the no-bubble condition lim y→−∞ F (y) < ∞ to rule out the exponential associated with the negative root. The constant A and the value-maximizing investment threshold y * * are determined by the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions. To derive these conditions, observe that the market value of cash flows is given by
Thus, the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions are
Simple algebra implies that y * * = y * and F (y) = g (y) . Thus, under complete markets the utility-maximizing investment policy is the same as the value-maximizing policy.
To show that this result holds for any strictly increasing utility function U, it suffices to note that we can apply the martingale method to rewrite the wealth dynamics (25)- (26) as the static budget constraint
where we have imposed the no Ponzi game assumption lim
B Computation Method
We describe the solution method to the free boundary problem described in proposition 1. The problem described in Proposition 3 can be solved similarly. We use the projection method implemented with collocation (Judd (1999) ). We do not use the traditional shooting method or finite difference method because these methods are inefficient for our nonlinear problem and extensive simulations.
We first rewrite the second order ODE (11) as a system of first-order ODEs. Let
. Then (11) can be rewritten as
The boundary conditions are
where (B2) is derived by the fact that when y → −∞, the entrepreneur never undertakes the investment project and hence his subjective option value equals zero.
The idea of the algorithm is to first ignore the smooth-pasting condition (B4) and then solve for a two point boundary value problem with a guessed threshold value y 0 .
The true value of the threshold is found by adjusting y 0 so that the smooth pasting condition (B4) is satisfied. Since the boundary condition (B2) is open end, we pick a very small negative number y and rewrite it as g y = 0. We then adjust y so that the solution is not sensitive to this value. The algorithm is outlined as follows.
Step 1. Start with a guess y 0 and a preset order n.
Step 2. Use Chebyshev polynomial to approximate g and h :
g (y; a) = Step 3. Search for y 0 such that the smooth-pasting condition, h y 0 ; b = 1/r, is approximately satisfied. This figure plots the impact on the value function and investment threshold for the model in section 2 when the risk aversion parameter γ increases from 1 to 2. Other parameter values are set as β = r = 2%, α = 0.1, σ = 30%, and I = 10. 
